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A New Approach to Review of NEPA Findings of No 
Significant Impact 
On New Year's Day, 1970, Congress recognized formally the need 
for a unified national environmental policy by enacting the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).1 Congress enacted 
NEPA in response to growing nationwide concern2 over increasing 
environmental harm resulting from uncontrolled population growth, 
high-density urbanization, rapid industrial expansion, resource ex-
ploitation, and unchecked technological advances. 3 The national pol-
icy embodied in the statute emphasized long-term environmental 
awareness and the responsibility of present generations to future ones 
for negative environmental consequences.4 On a more practical level, 
NEPA elevated environmental concerns to a position of parity with 
more traditional factors, particularly economic factors, in federal ad-
ministrative decisionmaking. 5 In short, NEPA reflected the mood of 
an environmentally enlightened nation and promised progressive 
change.6 
The first sections of NEPA state its broad national policy goals. 7 
1. 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-47 (1982); see F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 1 (1973). 
2. The enactment of NEPA capped a long period of national debate over the pervasiveness of 
negative environmental effects of modern society's activities. See F. ANDERSON, supra note l, at 
1. 
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1982). NEPA's legislative history concludes that "[t]he most 
dangerous of all [the enemies of human survival] is man's own undirected technology." H.R. 
REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
2751, 2753. 
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a), (b){l) (1982). 
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332{2)(B); Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. United States Dept. of 
Agric., 681 F.2d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1982). 
6. Initially, the federal agencies reacted sluggishly to NEPA. An early study found that 
"despite legislation, administrative rules, and public pressure, little had changed in the decision-
making and environmental practices of most federal agencies." D. MAZMANIAN & J. NIENA-
BER, CAN ORGANIZATIONS CHANGE? vii (1979). While this situation has undoubtedly changed, 
a subsequent study showed that many agencies were extremely slow in complying with NEP A's 
directives. See N. ORLOFF, THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT PROCESS 39-43 (1978). 
Furthermore, the general public becomes less concerned with environmental issues when 
other public issues appear more pressing. One commentator noted in 1976 that "[c]urrent energy 
problems and the economic crisis facing the nation [had] greatly reduced public enthusiasm for 
environmental constraints upon constructive economic activity." Dreyfus & Ingram, The Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act: A View of Intent and Practice, 16 NAT. REsoURCES J. 243, 260 
(1976). The lower visibility today of the environmental crises that triggered the environmental 
movement in the 1970s suggests that the general public's concern with environmental problems 
has not returned to its former level. See Ruckelshaus, Environmental Protection: A Brief History 
of the Environmental Movement in America and the Implications Abroad, 15 ENVTL. L. 455, 455-
58 (1985). 
7. The statute establishes six goals for the nation: (1) to act as "trustee of the environment 
for succeeding generations;" (2) to assure "safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and cul-
turally pleasing surroundings;" (3) to "attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environ-
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The statute's bite, however, is the administrative reform8 it promotes 
through its "action-forcing" provisions,9 which include the require-
ment that agencies prepare a detailed environmental impact statement 
(EIS) for "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of 
the human environment."10 Under NEPA, the preparation and use of 
an EIS requires several primary agency decisions. 11 The most impor-
ment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended 
consequences;" ( 4) to "preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national 
heritage, and maintain •.. an environment which supports diversity and variety of individual 
choice;" (5) to "achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high 
standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities;" and (6) to "enhance the quality of 
renewable resources and approach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources." 
42 u.s.c. § 433l(b) (1982). 
8. See F. ANDERSON, supra note l, at viii, where NEPA is described as "an administrative 
reform statute." The environmental movement in the 1960s was aimed in part at administrative 
agencies, which were "some of the worst offenders against the environment." D. MAZMANIAN & 
J. NIENABER, supra note 6, at vii Qisting the Atomic Energy Commission, the Forest Service, the 
Department ofTransportation, the Department oflnterior, and the Army Corps of Engineers as 
examples). The danger of allowing federal agencies to consider environmental impacts of their 
actions with unchecked discretion is noted in the legislative history of NEPA. See H.R. REP. 
No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2751, 
2753-54. 
9. The term "action-forcing" was used in the legislative history, 115 CONG. REc. 19,008, 
19,010 (1969), and has been adopted by commentators. See, e.g., F • .ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 
2; 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332-35 (1982); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1500.l(a) (1986). 
10. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). An EIS is a statment analyzing in detail the environmen-
tal impacts of an agency action. The section states in part: 
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, 
regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in 
accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal 
Government shall -
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other ma-
jor Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed 
statement by the responsible agency on -
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be 
implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the main-
tenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be in-
volved in the proposed action should it be implemented. Prior to making any detailed state-
ment, the responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any 
Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any envi-
ronmental impact involved. 
In addition to the EIS requirement, NEPA requires agencies to apply a "systematic, interdis-
ciplinary approach," including use of environment-related sciences, in taking action that may 
affect the environment, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A); to develop procedures, with the assistance of the 
Council on Environmental Quality, for complying with the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B); and, 
whether or not an EIS is required, to consider alternatives to actions that involve "unresolved 
conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E). 
11. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at viii. Three primary decisions have been identified. 
The first decision is whether the agency action requires an EIS. The second concerns the content 
and adequacy of an EIS. The third is whether to proceed with or forgo an action based on the 
information the EIS reveals. See Peltz & Weinman, NEPA Threshold Determinations: A Frame-
work of Analysis, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 71, 76 (1976) (identifying these decisions and suggesting 
that each requires a different legal analysis). 
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tant step in ensuring at least minimal compliance with NEP A's objec-
tives is the threshold decision 12 whether the environmental impact of a 
proposed action is potentially significant enough to warrant prepara-
tion of an EIS. 13 If the agency decides an EIS is necessary, it rigor-
ously balances environmental considerations against each other and 
against economic and social considerations, detailing its findings in an 
extensive report - the EIS.14 If the agency decides that an EIS is not 
required, 15 NEPA essentially mandates no further consideration of en-
vironmental factors, and any significant environmental effects that 
preparation of an EIS might have revealed remain unknown and unad-
dressed until they actually cause environmental harm.16 
Judicial review of agency interpretations of NEPA usually involves 
an analysis of whether the agency has met the EIS requirement. 17 In 
reviewing agency findings that the environmental impact of an action 
is not significant enough to require an EIS, the federal courts have 
developed different approaches. The conflict is one between the First, 
Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, which review the threshold de-
cision under the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA)18 "arbitrary 
and capricious" standard of review, 19 and the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, 
and Tenth Circuits, which employ a "reasonableness" standard.20 The 
District of Columbia Circuit applies a modified "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard that employs a four-part test.21 
The development of both the reasonableness standard and the arbi-
trary and capricious standard in the various circuits has yielded review 
12. An agency's decision to prepare or not to prepare an EIS is commonly called the "thresh-
old decision" or "threshold determination." 
13. An EIS may not be required for reasons other than insignificance of environmental im-
pact. See the cases cited in note 53 infra for examples. Congress recognized that in certain cases 
compliance with NEPA to "the fullest extent possible" would preclude preparation of an EIS. 
See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 2767, 2770. 
14. The essential elements of an EIS are spelled out in 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). See 
note 10 supra. 
15. This decision is termed a "Finding of No Significant Impact" (FONSI). See note 38 infra 
and accompanying text. 
16. See text accompanying notes 102-07 infra for a discussion of different views on the likeli-
hood of significant impact that should trigger preparation of an EIS. 
17. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 275. 
18. 5 u.s.c. §§ 701-06 (1982). 
19. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982); see, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868 (1st Cir. 1985); 
River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Engrs. of United States Army, 764 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1283 (1986); City of Alexandria v. Federal Highway Admin., 756 
F.2d 1014 (4th Cir. 1985); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 
U.S. 908 (1973). 
20. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1985); Foundation for N. Am. Wild 
Sheep v. United States Dept. of Agric., 681 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1982); Minnesota Pub. Interest 
Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1973); Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Coun-
cil v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973). 
21. See notes 114-19 infra and accompanying text. 
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approaches that range from nearly total deference to the agency22 to 
almost de novo review by the court. 23 The varying degree of judicial 
deference given agency threshold decisions may well stem from con-
flicting application of several Supreme Court decisions and disagree-
ment over whether to characterize the threshold decision as one of fact 
or law. In addition, courts impose different burdens of proof on an 
opponent of the agency decision. 
This Note examines the confused array of judicial approaches for 
reviewing agency findings of no significant environmental impact and 
proposes a standardized, comprehensive approach that ensures com-
pliance with both the procedural and substantive aspects of NEPA.24 
Part I reviews agency procedures mandated by NEPA which ensure 
that agencies develop a detailed record for judicial scrutiny and consti-
tute the legal basis against which to check agency threshold decisions. 
Part II examines the conflicting approaches of the lower courts, em-
phasizing their reliance on Supreme Court decisions, their characteri-
zation of the threshold decision as legal or factual, and the burden of 
proof each places on opponents of the agency decision. 
Part III proposes an intermediate approach toward judicial review 
that builds upon the District of Columbia Circuit's four-part inquiry. 
The proposed approach avoids the confusing terminology (such as 
"arbitrary and capricious" and "reasonableness") that characterizes 
current review standards. Instead, it prompts courts to make an indi-
vidual analysis of several interrelated parts of the threshold decision 
and to adopt a moderate burden of proof for the decision's challengers. 
The approach thus leads to a less deferential and more in-depth re-
view, which this Note argues is appropriate given that agencies gov-
erned by NEPA frequently lack environmental expertise. 
I. NEPA PROCEDURES AND THE EIS REQUIREMENT 
Congress intended NEPA to have substantive impact on adminis-
22. See, e.g., River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Engrs. of United States Army, 764 F.2d 
445, 449 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1283 (1986); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 
828-29 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); see also Note, Threshold Determinations 
Under Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA: The Case for "Reasonableness" as a Standard for Judicial 
Review, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 107, 114-20 (1974). 
23. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1985); City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 
F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th 
Cir. 1973). 
24. Although the Supreme Court has stated that NEP A's "mandate to the agencies is essen-
tially procedural," see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978), this Note argues that its substantive policy goals require 
agencies to err in favor of preparation of an EIS when an agency determines that an action is 
likely to, not that it necessarily will, have a significant environmental impact. See notes 128-30 
infra and accompanying text; see also W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
750 (1977); cf. City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 670 n.12 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting the 
broad substantive objectives of NEPA in addition to its narrower procedural elements). 
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trative decisionmaking.25 Rather than requiring agencies to reach stat-
utorily defined goals, however, Congress pursued agency reform 
through procedural mandates. It recognized that procedures requir-
ing serious consideration of environmental factors will, in some cases, 
significantly influence administrative decisions. Because NEPA can 
influence substantive agency decisions only through its procedural 
mandates, strict agency adherence to those procedures is crucial. 
NEPA procedures require preparation of an EIS for every major 
federal action significantly26 affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment. Unlike most other organic statutes,27 NEPA applies to all 
federal agencies. Even development-oriented agencies such as the 
Army Corps of Engineers are required to consider environmental con-
cerns that may conflict with their primary objectives. 28 NEPA there-
fore further established the Council on Environmental Quality 
(CEQ)29 to assist the various agencies in developing standardized pro-
cedures for complying with the EIS requirement. 30 
To fulfill this directive, the CEQ has promulgated regulations31 
25. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 
U.S. 519, 558 (1978) ("NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation .... "); 
see also R. ANDREWS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE 137 (1976) 
(noting that "[t]he effectiveness of NEPA ... must ultimately be measured not by the policies, 
procedures, and organizational structures through which it is translated, but by its influence on 
the substantive activities that are those organizations' outputs"). 
26. Although NEP A's language mandates the preparation of an EIS for every major federal 
action significantly affecting the environment, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) reg-
ulations promulgated under NEPA, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1986), and the vast majority of courts 
stipulate that the term "major" has no meaning independent of the term "significantly." See 
Shea, The Judicial Standard for Review of Environmental Impact Statement Threshold Decisions, 
9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.J. 63, 68-74 (1980). Thus, this Note treats the meaning of "significantly" 
as the cornerstone of the NEPA threshold decision. 
27. Organic statutes are statutes that establish a body such as a federal agency and the laws 
governing it. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 990 (5th ed. 1979) (definition of "Organic Act"). 
28. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 104; W. RODGERS, supra note 24, at 698; Leventhal, 
Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509, 515 (1974). 
For example, the Army Corps of Engineers, one of the oldest and busiest federal agencies, has as 
its primary objective the building and maintenance of numerous public works projects such as 
dams and navigational facilities. Often these objectives or the procedures to achieve them are in 
direct conflict with environmental concerns. See generally D. MAZMANIAN & J. NIENABER, 
supra note 6, at 8-12. See also Peltz & Weinman, supra note 11, at 89 ("[A]gencies often become 
carried away with their own abilities and defiantly refuse to comply with laws which they feel 
might hinder their operation. They may seek to insulate themselves from the law and judicial 
scrutiny, hiding behind the shield of expertise and a self-proclaimed autonomy."). 
29. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-47 (1982). The legislative history of NEPA reveals that Congress 
realized that because the policies of different federal agencies often conflict with each other and 
with the public interest, a central agency was needed. See H.R. REP. No. 378, 9lst Cong., 1st 
Sess. 3, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2751, 2753-54. 
30. 42 u.s.c. § 4332(2)(B) (1982). 
31. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-08 (1986). Federal agencies are subject to both the CEQ regulations 
and any procedures they develop internally for complying with NEPA. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. Part 
230 (1986) (Army Corps of Engineers policy and procedures for implementing NEPA); 40 
C.F.R. Part 6 (1986) (similar Environmental Protection Agency regulations). The agency proce-
dures are typically based on the CEQ regulations, but are tailored more closely to the internal 
operation of the agency. For example, while the CEQ regulations suggest generally that agencies 
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that are binding on all federal agencies. 32 The CEQ procedures re-
quire agencies initially to prepare an Environmental Assessment (EA), 
a brief33 document containing sufficient evidence and analysis for the 
agency to decide whether an EIS is required. 34 An agency can avoid 
preparing an EA only if the agency has already "categorically ex-
cluded"35 the type of action proposed from those potentially requiring 
an EIS, if the agency has already decided to prepare an EIS,36 or if the 
agency's organic legislation mandates procedures for consideration of 
environmental factors that are "functional equivalents" of the EIS 
process. 37 If,. after producing an EA, the agency decides an EIS is 
unnecessary, it must state the reasons for that decision in a "finding of 
no significant impact," a document commonly known as a FONSI.38 
The CEQ regulations thus contemplate situations in which an 
agency can legitimately terminate environmental inquiry because the 
identify classes of actions that will typically either have or not have significant environmental 
impact, 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (1986), an agency's internal procedures will usually give examples. 
See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 230.6 (1986) (actions normally requiring an EIS); 33 C.F.R. § 230.7 (ac· 
tions normally requiring an Environmental Assessment (EA), but not an EIS). But see N. OR· 
LOFF, supra note 6, at 39-43 (many agencies have been slow in following or have failed to follow 
CEQ directives). 
32. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3 (1986). The CEQ regulations were initially in the form of nonbinding 
guidelines, but were made binding by a Presidential Order requiring the CEQ to issue regulations 
on NEPA procedures. See Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225, 1236 (5th Cir. 1985); Founda· 
tion on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Cabinet Mountains 
Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1982); National Indian Youth Council v. 
Watt, 664 F.2d 220, 225 (10th Cir. 1981). Even where its regulations have not been made bind· 
ing, the "CEQ's interpretation of NEPA is entitled to substantial deference." Andrus v. Sierra 
Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979). 
33. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 870 (1st Cir. 1985); 33 C.F.R. Part 230, App. B, 
Para. 8.a. (1985) ("The EA shall be a brief document (should not normally exceed 15 pages) 
primarily focusing on whether or not the entire project ... could have significant effects on the 
environment .... "). 
34. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1986). 
35. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (1986); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(a)(2) (1986) (noting that the first 
step in deciding whether or not to prepare an EIS is to determine if the proposed action qualifies 
as a categorical exclusion). A categorical exclusion applies to categories of actions that an 
agency has found not to have a significant effect on the environment, either individually or cumu-
latively. However, the CEQ regulations require agencies to provide for special cases in which a 
normally excluded action may have a significant environmental effect. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (1986). 
There are few cases dealing with the validity of categorical exclusions. For an example, see 
City of Alexandria v. Federal Highway Admin., 756 F.2d 1014 (4th Cir. 1985) (categorical ex· 
clusion of highway projects in general and exclusion of particular project upheld as not arbitrary 
or capricious). 
36. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3(a) (1986). 
37. Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 367 n.51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de11ied, 
454 U.S. 1092 (1981). For example, § 111 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1982), has 
been held to require the "functional equivalent" of an EIS. See Sierra Club v. Castle, 657 F.2d 
298, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
38. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (1986). Under the CEQ regulations, FONSis and EISs are both 
considered environmental documents which are open to public and judicial scrutiny. See 40 
C.F.R. § 1508.10 (1986); see also Leventhal, supra note 28, at 521 ("The courts have evolved a 
requirement that an agency which believes an impact statement is unnecessary must give a state· 
ment of its reasons."). 
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EA it prepares supports a FONSI. Nonetheless, while an EA can pro-
vide support for a FONSI and a decision not to prepare an EIS, agen-
cies should not attempt to substitute an EA for an EIS if indeed the 
action is likely to have a significant impact.39 Unlike an EIS, an EA 
identifies the presence or absence of potential significant environmen-
tal impacts after engaging in only a minimal balancing of environmen-
tal, social, economic, and other factors. 40 By contrast, the EIS is a 
much longer41 document that studies environmental factors in greater 
detail and includes extensive balancing of factors. Moreover, it fo-
cuses more extensively on alternatives to the action,42 identifies "irre-
versible and irretrievable commitments of resources"43 to a project, 
and provides greater opportunity for comment from other agencies 
and the public. 44 
In sum, an EIS and an EA supporting a FONSI convey to the 
public significantly different messages. The EA, if it makes accurate 
findings, suggests that the agency action is environmentally sound in 
all respects, thereby justifying a relaxed view toward environmental 
aspects of the action. The EIS, by contrast, acknowledges that the 
action might result in environmental harm and thus establishes a basis 
for ongoing environmental sensitivity. Furthermore, because an EIS 
identifies latent environmental impacts and analyzes existing environ-
39. For an excellent discussion of the differences between EAs and EISs, see Sierra Club v. 
Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 875 (1st Cir. 1985) (arguing that it is dangerous to treat an EA as if it were 
an EIS because the two documents play different roles). See also Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 
1081, 1084 (5th Cir. 1985). But see River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps ofEngrs. of the United 
States Army, 764 F.2d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1283 (1986) ("The 
necessary judgments [in analyzing environmental impacts] are inherently subjective and nor-
mally can be made as reliably on the basis of an environmental assessment as on the basis of a[n] 
... [EIS)."). 
40. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 875 (1st Cir. 1985). 
41. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R § 1502.7 (1986), which states that EISs shall normally be less than 
150 pages and that even unusually detailed EISs shall be less than 300 pages. But cf River Road 
Alliance, Inc. v. Corps ofEngrs. of United States Army, 764 F.2d 445, 449 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1283 (1986) (acknowledging an EIS of 858 pages plus two appendices). 
42. NEPA mandates discussion of alternatives in both the EIS provision, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332(2)(C) (1982), and in 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E) (1982), which applies to all agency actions, 
regardless of significant environmental impact, having "unresolved conflicts concerning alterna-
tive uses of available resources." An EA may discuss alternatives, and in some cases an agency's 
internal procedures for compliance with NEPA require such a discussion. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. 
Part 230, App. B, Para. 8.a. (1986) ("[T]he EA shall include a discussion of reasonable alterna-
tives. However, when the EA confirms that the impact of the applicant's proposal is not signifi-
cant, there are no 'unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resource [sic] .. .' 
and the proposed action is a water dependent activity, the EA need not include a discussion on 
alternatives ... .''). 
43. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(v) (1982). 
44. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 875 (1st Cir. 1985). Although some outside advice is 
envisioned under 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b), the comment period for an EA coupled with a FONSI is 
limited to thirty days and, in some cases, is not required at all. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e)(2) (1986). 
The outside input requirement for an EIS, on the other hand, involves a broad range of partici-
pants. See generally 40 C.F.R. Part 1503 (1986). Furthermore, the comment period for a draft 
EIS is ninety days and for a final EIS thirty days. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.10 (1986). 
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mental impacts in much greater detail than an EA, it provides a 
sounder basis for the exercise of agency discretion regarding the ulti-
mate substantive decision to continue, modify, or even reject the pro-
posed action. 
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE EIS THRESHOLD DECISION 
In NEP A's early years, federal courts applied as many as five stan-
dards of revieW45 to agency decisions not to prepare an EIS. The rea-
sonableness staµdard46 and the arbitrary and capricious standard47 are 
the only ones tliat have survived subsequent judicial refinements, and 
the development of the respective standards has at times produced in-
consistent variations.48 Many courts, however, have simply concluded 
that in practice the two standards are the same. 49 
The difference among the circuits can best be characterized as a 
dispute over the proper degree of deference due agency threshold deci-
sions. This application of different degrees of deference reflects the 
courts' fundamental disagreement over the strength of NEPA as an 
administrative reform statute and on the willingness and ability of di-
45. See Peltz & Weinman, supra note 11, at 82-86 (identifying applications of the arbitrary 
and capricious standard, a substantial evidence test, a rational basis test, the reasonableness stan-
dard, and de novo review); Note, supra note 22, at 117-26 (identifying the same five standards). 
46. See note 20 supra and accompanying text. 
47. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. 
48. For example, compare Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 870-71 (1st Cir. 1985) (apply-
ing the arbitrary and capricious standard and requiring the challenger to show a substantial 
possibility of significant environmental impact), Providence Road Community Assn. v. EPA, 683 
F.2d 80, 82 & n.3 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying the arbitrary and capricious standard and distin-
guishing standards of review that require challengers to raise a substantial environmental issue), 
and Citizen Advocates for Responsible Expansion v. Dole, 770 F.2d 423, 432 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(applying the reasonableness standard and requiring the challenger to raise a substantial environ-
mental issue). 
49. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 871 (1st Cir. 1985); River Road Alliance, 
Inc. v. Corps of Engrs. of United States Army, 764 F.2d 445, 449 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
106 S. Ct. 1283 (1986); City of Alexandria v. Federal Highway Admin., 756 F.2d 1014, 1017 (4th 
Cir. 1985); Boles v. Onton Dock, Inc., 659 F.2d 74, 75 (6th Cir. 1981); see also Note, Judicial 
Review of Agency Action, 32 U. KAN. L. REV. 884, 897 (1984) ("Courts would do better to state 
their interpretation of the 'arbitrary and capricious' test in terms of simple 'reasonableness' and 
avoid the temptation to recite the over-developed list of synonomous phrases."). 
The Supreme Court has also suggested that the two standards are similar. See Baltimore Gas 
& Elec. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87 (1983). The Court noted that the 
courts' role "is simply to ensure that the agency has adequately considered and disclosed the 
environmental impacts of its actions and that its decision is not arbitrary and capricious." 462 
U.S. at 97-98 (emphasis added). Later, the Court found that "(i]t is not unreasonable for the 
Commission to counteract the uncertainties in postsealing releases by balancing them with an 
overestimate ofpresealing releases." 462 U.S. at 103 (emphasis added). But cf. Gee v. Boyd, 471 
U.S. 1058, 1060 (1985) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (The conflict among the 
circuits "is not merely semantic or academic."); Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225, 1237-38 
(5th Cir. 1985) ("The reasonableness standard is clearly 'a more rigorous standard .•. than the 
rule of arbitrary and capricious review that ordinarily governs agency actions.' . . . It is clear ••• 
that a court applying the reasonableness test may, in certain circumstances, receive and weigh 
evidence beyond that in the administrative record.") (quoting Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081, 
1084 (5th Cir. 1985)). 
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verse federal agencies to comply adequately with NEP A's procedural 
mandates. In justifying their positions, courts employ conflicting in-
terpretations of relevant Supreme Court decisions · and disagree 
whether to characterize the threshold decision as legal or factual. As a 
result, the courts apply different burdens of proof to challengers of 
agency FONSis. 
The use of Supreme Court decisions is particularly unhelpful in 
resolving the standard of review conflict. The Supreme Court has not 
yet come close to examining in detail the issues surrounding the 
threshold decision or heard persuasive arguments for adopting one ap-
proach over others. Similarly, the debate over the characterization of 
the threshold decison as factual or legal is misdirected . because the 
decision is concededly one involving both factual and legal elements. 50 
Choosing one characterization over the other oversimplifies what 
should be a careful and detailed judicial analysis. The burden of proof 
issue is a critical starting point in review of FONSis that deserves a 
more reasoned resolution than it presently receives. The next three 
sections examine these factors in tum. 
A. Disparate Interpretations of Supreme Court Decisions 
Supreme Court cases interpreting NEPA primarily involve agency 
decisions made in the course of preparing an EIS,51 or an agency's 
failure to consider environmental concerns when preparation of an 
EIS was concededly not at issue. 52 Supreme Court cases that examine 
the threshold decision not to prepare an EIS focus on whether the EIS 
provisions of NEPA apply at all to the type of action involved, rather 
than on the significance of the proposed action's environmental im-
pact. 53 The Court has refused two opportunities to resolve the circuit 
split over the proper standard of review of an agency's decision not to 
prepare an EIS. 54 In spite of this silence, lower courts regularly have 
50. See notes 87-101 infra and accompanying text. 
51. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87 
(1983) (challenge of an EIS which was based on the assumption that permanent storage of cer-
tain nuclear waste would have no significant impact); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (challenge of an EIS for failure to 
consider energy conservation as an alternative to nuclear energy). 
52. See, e.g., Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (per 
curiam) (agency failure to consider alternatives pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E), a require-
ment independent of the EIS requirement). 
53. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139 
(1981) (EIS not required for a naval facility capable of storing nuclear weapons because of na-
tional security reasons); Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979) (EIS not required for appro-
priations requests); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (regional EIS not required in 
addition to comprehensive national EIS because the agency did not have· a regional program, 
proposal or recommendation); Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Assn. of Okla., 426 U.S. 
776 (1976) (EIS not required because of a conflict of statutory duty). 
54. In order to resolve the split, Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, 
would have granted certiorari in Gee v. Boyd, cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1058 (1985), noting that the 
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relied on several Supreme Court decisions to support conflicting stan-
dards of review. 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe 55 is one Supreme Court 
case often cited in the conflicting lower court decisions. Although 
Overton Park did not involve NEPA, 56 courts have applied it to a 
broad range of administrative actions, relying on its extensive discus-
sion of the scope of review provisions in the Administrative Proce-
dures Act (AP A), 57 particularly the Court's construction of the AP A's 
arbitrary and capricious standard. The Court in Overton Park estab-
lished a broad category of actions that "must be set aside if the action 
was 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law' or if the action failed to meet statutory, proce-
dural, or constitutional requirements."58 The Court noted that under 
the arbitrary and capricious standard the agency decision at issue is 
entitled to a "presumption of regularity."59 However, it added that 
"conflict is not merely semantic or academic." 471 U.S. at 1060. In Morningside Renewal 
Council v. Atomic Energy Commn., cert. denied, 417 U.S. 951 (1974), Justice Douglas dissented 
from the denial of certiorari, partly in recognition of the conflict between courts that applied the 
arbitrary and capricious standard and those that applied the reasonableness standard. 
55. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
56. Overton Park upheld a citizens group's challenge of the Secretary of Transportation's 
failure to consider alternatives to the proposed route of a highway through a public park. Fed-
eral statutes prohibited the Secretary from issuing funds for a highway running through a public 
park if a "feasible and prudent" alternative route existed. See 401 U.S. at 405. 
The statute in Overton Park has been distinguished from NEPA. Judge Leventhal has noted 
that 
(w]hereas the statutory provision construed in Overton Park gives environmental values 
dominant significance under certain circumstances, NEPA does not assign a relative weight 
to environmental concerns and therefore leads the courts to recognize much broader govern-
mental discretion in deciding whether or not those concerns should prevail in a given case. 
Leventhal, supra note 28, at 520. 
57. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). The section reads: 
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide 
all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and deter-
mine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court 
shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and 
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be -
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law· 
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; 
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory 
right; 
(D) without observance of procedure required by law; 
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of 
this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute; or 
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to a trial de novo 
by the reviewing court. In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall 
review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account 
shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error. 
58. 401 U.S. at 414. 
59. 401 U.S. at 415. One commentator has noted that while many courts have read the 
"presumption of regularity" language as signaling that the agency decision under review is sub· 
stantively correct, the more probable meaning of the phrase is that the Court will presume that 
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this presumption does not shield the decision from a "thorough, prob-
ing, in-depth review."60 Without explaining this apparent ambiguity, 
the Court then described the mechanics of review under the arbitrary 
and capricious standard. The initial inquiry is whether "on the facts 
the [agency's] decision can reasonably be said" to be within the 
agency's statutory range of choices. Second, the reviewing court must 
find that the actual decision was not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,"61 a test which is 
met if the decision was based on consideration of relevant factors and 
was not a "clear error of judgment."62 Finally, the court must ensure 
that the agency complied with procedural requirements. 63 
The lower courts have drawn upon the ambiguous terminology 
employed in Overton Park to support both a relatively deferential arbi-
trary and capricious standard64 and a more rigorous reasonableness 
standard. 65 The use of Overton Park to support the arbitrary and ca-
pricious standard is fairly predictable given Overton Park's attempt to 
define the standard explicitly. Courts applying the arbitrary and ca-
pricious standard, however, risk overreliance on agency discretion in a 
context where the judicial check on agency action is particulary im-
portant. 66 More importantly, application of the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard does not necessarily ensure systematic judicial review 
of an agency's compliance with NEPA's procedures. 
The more persuasive cases are those applying Overton Park to sup-
port the reasonableness standard. Some of these cases have deter-
mined that review of the threshold EIS decision is governed by the 
first part of the Overton Park inquiry, which asks whether the decision 
is "reasonably" within the range of choices the agency is allowed by 
statute to make. 67 Others, apparently relying more on the second part 
the agency acted within its delegated authority and require a challenger to the agency action to 
assert more than unsupported allegations of error in order to prevail. See Stever, Deference to 
Administrative Agencies in Federal Environmental, Health and Safety Litigation - Thoughts on 
Varying Judicial Applications of the Rule, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 35, 42-44 (1983). 
60. 401 U.S. at 415. 
61. 401 U.S. at 416 (emphasis added) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1964 ed., Supp. V)). 
62. 401 U.S. at 416. The Court describes this standard as a narrow one that does not allow 
the court to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. 
63. 401 U.S. at 417. 
64. See, e.g., City of Alexandria v. Federal Highway Admin., 756 F.2d 1014, 1017 (4th Cir. 
1985); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); 
see also Shea, supra note 26, at 83, 100. 
65. See, e.g., Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 
1974); Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 1973); 
Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1973). 
66. See, e.g., River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Engrs. of United States Army, 764 F.2d 
445, 449 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1283 (1986) ("[R]ealism about the danger of 
abuse does not require a change in the [arbitrary and capricious] standard of review."). 
67. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1320 & n.17 (8th Cir. 
1974); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1973). 
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of the Overton Park test, have applied the reasonableness standard to 
the type of discretion referred to in the "abuse of discretion" phrase of 
the arbitrary and capricious standard when reviewing threshold EIS 
decisions in light of NEP A's "mandatory requirements and high 
standards. " 68 
At least two circuits that apply the reasonableness standard to the 
decision not to prepare an EIS rely on Overton Park to apply the less 
rigorous arbitrary and capricious standard to an agency's ultimate de-
cision either to proceed with or to abandon an action based on a full 
weighing of environmental considerations in an EIS. 69 These cases 
treat the agency's decision not to prepare an EIS as potentially beyond 
its statutory range of legally permissible choices - a decision mea-
sured by reasonableness - and the agency's ultimate decision on 
whether to proceed with an action based on a completed EIS as one 
deserving greater judicial deference. The absence of a thorough 
weighing of environmental and nonenvironmental factors in an EA 
and the possibility that significant impacts might become apparent 
only after the completion of the detailed study involved in an EIS but-
tress the logic of applying these different tests to different agency deci-
sions under NEPA. 7° Furthermore, the fact that Congress chose to 
influence substantive agency choices by requiring agencies to follow 
NEPA's procedures to the "fullest extent possible"71 implies that 
agency discretion regarding those procedures is much narrower than 
agency discretion exercised after preparing an EIS. 72 
Nonetheless, the vague term "reasonableness," while arguably en-
suring that courts take an especially detailed look at threshold deci-
sions under NEPA, fails to ensure that courts review agencies' 
compliance with NEPA's specific procedural requirements. The com-
mon failure of the "reasonableness" and "arbitrary and capricious" 
standards to ensure such compliance suggests that courts have given 
inadequate attention to the final part of the Overton Park test, which 
emphasizes judicial attention to procedural requirements.73 
More recently, courts using some version of the arbitrary and ca-
pricious standard have relied on the Supreme Court opinions in Kleppe 
68. Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 1973). 
69. See Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 
1974); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1973). 
70. See note 11 supra and accompanying text. 
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). 
72. See Save Our Ten Acres, 472 F.2d at 466 (footnote omitted): 
While the Court made it clear that the ultimate merit decision based upon a weighing of 
these environmental considerations should be reviewed under the arbitrary, capricious, or 
abuse of discretion standard, a thorough study of Overton Park teaches that a more penetrat-
ing inquiry is appropriate for court-testing the entry·way determination of whether all rele-
vant factors should ever be considered by the agency. 
73. See note 63 supra. 
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v. Sierra Club 74 and Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council 75 Kleppe concerned the necessity of a regional EIS 
when the Department of Interior had already prepared EISs for a na-
tional program authorizing coal leases and for several local mining 
operations under the program. The Court held that NEPA did not 
require the Department to prepare a regional EIS because the Depart-
ment had no regional plan, recommendation, or proposal. 76 Propo-
nents applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to threshold 
decisions have relied on the Kleppe Court's statement that the agency's 
discretion could be challenged successfully only upon a showing of 
"arbitrary action."77 
The Kleppe review standard, however, cannot be extended to EIS 
threshold decisions. None of the parties in Kleppe argued that the im-
pact of coal mining in the region would be insignificant. The appropri-
ate extent of agency discretion in the decision at issue in Kleppe -
whether to prepare two EISs - is clearly greater than agency discre-
tion to forgo preparing an EIS altogether. The latter decision effec-
tively prevents any detailed environmental inquiry while the former 
merely concludes that one context for preparing an EIS is preferable 
to another. 78 
Similarly, Baltimore Gas has been advanced in support of the arbi-
trary and capricious standard. 79 In Baltimore Gas, opponents chal-
lenged the agency's decision to ignore uncertainties in the 
environmental effects of nuclear waste storage. The agency assumed 
that such storage would result in no release of radiation to the envi-
ronment but conceded that if the zero-release assumption was wrong, 
the environmental impacts would be significant. Nonetheless, the 
agency decided that the possibility of radiation release was too uncer-
tain to factor into individual licensing decisions. The decision states 
broadly that the judicial role under NEPA is merely to ensure that 
agencies give adequate consideration to environmental factors and that 
74. 427 U.S. 390 (1976). 
75. 462 U.S. 87 (1983). 
76. 427 U.S. at 399. 
77. 427 U.S. at 412. See Providence Road Community Assn. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 80, 82 (4th 
Cir. 1982) (quoting Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 412); Shea, supra note 26, at 100 ("There is no discern· 
able basis for distinguishing the decision to prepare a regional or comprehensive impact state-
ment from more specific statements."); see also Aertsen v. Landrieu, 488 F. Supp. 314, 321 n.4 
(D. Mass.), order affd., 631 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1980) (suggesting that Kleppe might foreclose use of 
the more stringent reasonableness standard, but applying that standard anyway in the absence of 
a more explicit statement by the Court). 
78. See 427 U.S. at 414-15 ("[T]here exists no proposal for regionwide action that could 
require a regional impact statement .... "). 
79. See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In 
that case, while adopting the seemingly deferential arbitrary and capricious standard, the court 
nonetheless stated that "courts must play a cardinal role in the realization ofNEPA's mandate." 
756 F.2d at 151. 
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their decisions are not arbitrary and capricious. 80 
Reliance on Baltimore Gas to support a deferential arbitrary and 
capricious standard in the present context is not entirely appropriate. 
First, the case does not involve a threshold decision. 81 Second, and 
more significantly, the zero-release assumption was based on a set of 
documents that, for all practical purposes, already amounted to an 
EIS,82 and thus the Court's review was more characteristic of review 
of EIS-type balancing than of EA-type determination of significance. 
In short, the Supreme Court's failure to enunciate the proper stan-
dard of review for threshold EIS decisions has left courts without 
needed guidance in this area. The Court has established general prin-
ciples recognizing that NEPA is essentially a procedural statute, 83 and 
that a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency in 
reviewing NEPA decisions.84 Similarly, the Court has stated that 
courts cannot compel agencies to give environmental considerations 
determinative weight85 or require procedures beyond those required 
by NEPA 86 in their overall decisionmaking. Yet, neither these princi-
ples nor the cases decided in related areas have provided lower courts 
with a clear and workable standard for review. Instead, courts have 
apparently manipulated the vague terminology of Supreme Court 
cases resolving issues related to, but distinguishable from, the review 
of threshold decisions to support their predetermined standards of 
review. 
B. Significant Impact: Question of Fact or Question of Law? 
A court's choice to characterize the threshold decision as either 
factual or legal influences the degree of deference it will apply to the 
decision. Courts espousing the arbitrary and capricious standard tend 
to characterize the decision as primarily factual, thus warranting 
greater deference to agency discretion. Those following the reasona-
bleness standard view the threshold decision as a legal one, warranting 
more expanded judicial scrutiny on review. 87 
80. 462 U.S. at 97-98. 
81. The threshold decision is distinct from other types of decisions under NEPA. See note 
44 supra and accompanying text. 
82. See 462 U.S. at 99 n.12. 
83. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 
U.S. 519, 558 (1978). 
84. See 435 U.S. at 555; Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976). 
85. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (per 
curiam). 
86. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 524, 528. 
87. Compare Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 829-30 (2d Cir. 1972) ("[T]he APA stan-
dard permits effective judicial scrutiny of agency action and concommitantly [sic] permits the 
agencies to have some leeway in applying the law to factual contexts in which they possess exper-
tise."), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973), and River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Engrs. of 
United States Army, 764 F.2d 445, 449 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The statutory concept of 'significant' 
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The disagreement over characterization of the threshold decision 
as a question of law or of fact is illustrated by two early interpretations 
of NEPA. In Hanly v. Kleindienst, 88 business and residential members 
of a Manhattan neighborhood sought to enjoin the construction of a 
federal criminal detention center in the neighborhood until an EIS was 
prepared. The Second Circuit identified in the threshold decision both 
a question of law - the meaning of the term "significantly" - and a 
question of fact - whether an action will have a significant impact. 89 
Although the Court recognized the "possible availability" of a reason-
ableness standard to review the mixed question of law and fact,90 it 
relied on Overton Park, holding that the crucial, primarily factual de-
termination of whether an action has a significant impact should be 
reviewed under the less demanding AP A arbitrary and capricious 
standard.91 Importantly, the Hanly court found that the arbitrary and 
capricious standard "permits the agencies to have some leeway in ap-
plying the law to factual contexts in which they have expertise."92 
Similarly, other courts that apply this standard have been willing to 
defer to the agency's "good faith judgment."93 
In Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 94 on the other 
hand, the Tenth Circuit held that because the EIS requirement is 
stated in mandatory terms, its applicability involves an essentially 
legal determination.95 In that case, an environmental group chal-
impact has no determinate meaning, and to interpret it sensibly ... requires a comparison that is 
also a prediction: whether the time and expense of preparing an environmental impact statement 
are commensurate with the likely benefits from a more searching evaluation than an environmen-
tal assessment provides. The nature of the required judgment explains why we have held that an 
agency's decision not to prepare an environmental impact statement will be set aside only if it is 
an abuse of discretion."), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 1283 (1986), and Sierra Club v. United States 
Dept. of Transp., 753 F.2d 120, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("If a finding of no significant impact is 
made after analyzing the EA, then preparation of an EIS is unnecessary. An agency has broad 
discretion in making this determination .... ")(citation omitted), with Foundation for N. Am. 
Wild Sheep v. United States Dept. of Agric., 681 F.2d 1172, 1177 n.24 (9th Cir. 1982) ("We 
believe that the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard is primarily applicable to reviewing an 
agency's discretionary decisions. The decision to prepare an EIS, however, is not committed to 
the agency's discretion."), and Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 
1249 (10th Cir. 1973) ("We are persuaded that the general reference to discretion in [the APA] 
... does not apply here to the agency's determination under NEPA."), and Save Our Ten Acres 
v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1973) ("The spirit of the Act would die aborning if a 
facile, ex parte decision that the project was minor or did not significantly affect the environment 
were too well shielded from impartial review."). 
88. 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972) (applying the arbitrary and capricious standard), cert. de-
nied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). 
89. 471 F.2d at 828. 
90. 471 F.2d at 829. 
91. 471 F.2d at 829-30. 
92. 471 F.2d at 829-30. 
93. See, e.g., Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Assn. v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225, 229 (7th Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976). 
94. 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973) (applying the reasonableness standard). 
95. 484 F.2d at 1248-49. 
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lenged the Forest Service's decision to authorize a timber sale without 
preparing an EIS. Unlike the Hanly court, the Wyoming Outdoor 
Council court held that NEPA does not leave the decision to unlimited 
agency discretion; instead, "the compass of the judgment to be made is 
narrow."96 The court concluded that the reasonableness standard it 
chose to apply is consistent with the last phrase of the AP A arbitrary 
and capricious standard, which requires courts to overturn agency de-
cisions not "in accordance with law."97 The court stressed that "[t]he 
sweep of NEPA is extremely broad."98 
Ultimately, the disagreement over the proper characterization of 
the threshold decision as a question of law or of fact is a pointless 
debate, and of little importance to courts reviewing EIS threshold de-
cisions since Hanly and Wyoming Outdoor Council 99 Legal scholars 
have often noted that questions of law can be recharacterized to look 
like questions of fact and vice versa. 100 Indeed, skeptics have con-
cluded that courts usually characterize a decision as one of fact or law 
only after deciding the appropriate degree of judicial intervention.101 
C. Burden of Proof Issues 
In addition to the standard ofreview, courts have also disagreed on 
the closely related issue of what burden of proof must be imposed on 
the party challenging the agency decision not to prepare an EIS. 102 
Specifically, courts have differed over whether a challenger must show 
(1) that an action will have a significant impact;103 (2) that a substan-
tial possibility exists that the action will have a significant impact; 104 or 
96. 484 F.2d at 1249. 
97. See, e.g., Note, supra note 22, at 118. 
98. 484 F.2d at 1249 (citing National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 656 (10th Cir. 
1971)). 
99. For a discussion of the disagreement among scholars, particularly Professors Davis and 
Jaffe, see Note, supra note 22, at 114-17; Comment, Judicial Review of a NEPA Negative State· 
ment, 53 B.U. L. REV. 879, 893 (1973). . 
100. See, e.g., L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 546-47 (1965) 
("[I)n many situations it is difficult, perhaps indeed impossible, to make a clean distinction be-
tween fact and Jaw; that the difference is one of degree, that the relation of fact and law can be 
described as a spectrum with finding of fact shading imperceptibly into conclusion of Jaw."). 
101. See, e.g., Peltz & Weinman, supra note 11, at 90 ("[l]t is naive to assume that courts 
determine the proper scope based upon whether they find the issue involved to be legal or factual. 
It is submitted that more often than not, courts attach the Jaw or fact label after they have 
determined what scope of review to employ.") (emphasis in original). 
102. The burden of proof issue has been addressed primarily by those jurisdictions employing 
the reasonableness standard. For the earliest example of such a discussion, see Save Our Ten 
Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466-67 (5th Cir. 1973). But see Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 
868, 870-71 (1st Cir. 1985) (discussing burden of proof but applying the arbitrary and capricious 
standard). 
103. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Lee, 596 F. Supp. 645, 651-52 (E.D. La. 1984), vacated and re-
manded, 758 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1985). 
104. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081, 1084 (5th Cir. 1985); City of Davis v. Cole-
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(3) that the action might have a significant impact. 105 Courts advocat-
ing the heaviest burden of proof fear manipulation of agencies by op-
ponents of proposed actions. 106 Courts imposing an easier burden on 
challengers cite the possibility that significant environmental impacts 
may be revealed only after the preparation of a full-fledged EIS, and 
add that agency opponents required to meet a high burden of proof 
essentially would have to conduct their own EIS-type investigation to 
succeed. 107 
The courts have also differed as to whether a challenger's satisfac-
tion of the burden of proof is sufficient to compel preparation of an 
EIS108 or whether it merely shifts the burden to the agency to prove 
the reasonableness of its decision. 109 Finally, one court requires the 
challenger to raise substantial issues not considered in the administra-
tive record in order to satisfy the burden of proof, 110 essentially pre-
cluding review if the challenger merely attacks issues actually 
considered by the agency in making its decision. Because these differ-
ences over the burden of proof can significantly effect the outcome of 
challenges to agency FONSis, an attempt to resolve them is in order. 
Ill. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO REVIEW OF THE EIS 
THRESHOLD DECISION 
The divergent approaches the federal courts have developed for re-
view of EIS threshold decisions, although given the conclusory labels 
"reasonableness" and "arbitrary and capricious," in fact range from a 
narrow to a broad review. Any approach must incorporate existing 
Supreme Court principles governing interpretation of NEP A. 111 
However, because the cases the Court has decided involved situations 
in which the agencies had already given environmental factors at least 
some weight, those decisions do not provide sufficient guidance con-
cerning review of the threshold decision. At the threshold stage, a 
reviewing court should be concerned whether environmental concerns, 
if they exist and are significant, will be given any weight at all beyond 
man, 521 F.2d 661, 673 (9th Cir. 1975); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467 (5th 
Cir. 1973). 
105. See, e.g., Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. United States Dept. of Agric., 681 F.2d 
1172, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 1982). 
106. See, e.g., Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 & n.9A (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 
412 U.S. 908 (1973). 
107. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081, 1084 (5th Cir. 1985); City of Davis v. Cole-
man, 521 F.2d 661, 673 (9th Cir. 1975). 
108. See, e.g., Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. United States Dept. of Agric., 681 F.2d 
1172, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 1982). 
109. See, e.g., Winnebago Tribe v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269, 271 (8th Cir. 1980). This approach, 
however, raises the problem of post-hoc rationalizations. See notes 144-4 7 infra and accompany-
ing text. 
110. See, e.g., Winnebago Tribe, 621 F.2d at 271. 
111. See notes 83-86 supra and accompanying text. 
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the cursory treatment in an EA. 112 
The key problem with almost every existing judicial approach is 
the courts' insistence on using a single-step standard of review to scru-
tinize an agency's determination of environmental insignificance in-
stead of examining the several decisions that make up the agency's 
determination. A more consistent judicial approach would focus scru-
tiny on agency compliance with NEPA procedures leading to the 
threshold decision, examining different points in the agency's analysis 
in order to determine the overall acceptability of the agency's decision. 
The four-part test developed by the District of Columbia Circuit pro-
vides a starting point for such an inquiry. 113 
A. The Test of the District of Columbia Circuit 
The District of Columbia Circuit's approach to the review of an 
agency's decision not to prepare an EIS involves a four-part inquiry. 
First, the reviewing court must conclude that the agency took a "hard 
look" at the problem generally and did not simply make bald conclu-
sions.114 In part, this portion of the inquiry reiterates the need for an 
adequate record, which is now also required by the CEQ regulations 
112. See Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081, 1084 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Any decision based on an 
environmental assessment is necessarily more speculative than one made after the preparation 
and full consideration required by an impact statement."). 
113. For the earliest enunciation of this test, see Judge Leventhal's opinion in Maryland· 
Natl. Capital Park & Planning Commn. v. United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1040 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973). In announcing the test, Judge Leventhal emphasized that "in cases involving genuine 
issues as to health, and environmental resources, there is a relatively low threshold for impact 
statements." 487 F.2d at 1040. Interestingly, Judge Leventhal did not purport to choose either 
the reasonableness or the arbitrary and capricious standard, stating instead that the issue was 
"whether the Postal Service 'unreasonably' or 'arbitrarily' failed to file an environmental impact 
statement." 487 F.2d at 1035. Subsequent decisions in the circuit have used the test in conjunc· 
tion with the arbitrary and capricious standard. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Dept. of 
Transp., 753 F.2d 120, 126-27 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Town of Orangetown v. Gorsuch, 718 
F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1983) (basically adopting the D.C. test for the Second Circuit, which ordina· 
rily applies the arbitrary and capricious standard of review), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984). 
114. Maryland-Nat/. Capital Park, 487 F.2d at 1040. The District of Columbia Circuit first 
enunciated the "hard look" doctrine in Greater Boston Television Corp. v. Federal Communica· 
tions Commn., 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). The court 
stated that 
[i]ts supervisory function calls on the court to intervene not merely in the case of procedural 
inadequacies, or bypassing of the mandate in the legislative charter, but more broadly if the 
court becomes aware, especially from a combination of danger signals, that the agency has 
not really taken a "hard look" at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in 
reasoned decision-making. If the agency has not shirked this fundamental task, however, 
the court exercises restraint and affirms the agency's action even though the court would on 
its own account have made different findings or adopted different standards. • • . If satisfied 
that the agency has taken a hard look at the issues with the use of reasons and standards, the 
court will uphold its findings, though of less than ideal clarity, if the agency's path may be 
reasonably discerned, though of course the court must not be left to guess as to the agency's 
findings or reasons. 
444 F.2d at 851 (footnotes omitted). 
The "hard look" test was extended by the Supreme Court to decisions involving NEPA in 
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) ("The only role for a court is to insure that 
the agency has taken a 'hard look' at the environmental consequences ••.. "). See also Baltimore 
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and judicial precedent. 115 Second, the agency must have identified the 
relevant areas of environmental concern, 116 a requirement inherent in 
those decisions requiring a challenger to allege factors not considered 
by the agency. 117 Third, the agency must make a "convincing case" 
for its finding that factors it did consider will have no significant im-
pact.118 Finally, the agency must show convincingly that any planned 
modifications in the proposed action will reduce the significance of im-
pacts below that compelling preparation of an EIS.119 
The major strength of this test is that by questioning different steps 
in the agency's decision, it avoids substitution of the court's judgment 
for that of the agency, while exposing flaws in the agency's considera-
tion of environmental concerns. Its weakness is its reliance on the 
vague "hard look" and "convincing case" tests. In the context of the 
EIS threshold decision, the term "hard look" is misleading in that the 
entire issue is whether the agency will indeed take the "hard look" 
inherent in the preparation of an EIS. Furthermore, courts must have 
a better sense of the most important points of inquiry in reviewing 
agency FONSis if the "convincing case" test is to provide a uniform 
basis for determining whether the agency has complied with NEP A's 
procedural mandates. The following proposed approach incorporates 
the strengths of the District of Columbia's test but provides a more 
standardized method of review. 
B. A Proposed Systematic Standard of Review 
This proposed approach for review of EIS threshold decisions 
identifies decisional factors that require heightened judicial scrutiny. 
The approach calls for courts to scrutinize the distinction between the 
EA and the EIS, the consistency of the agency's decision with other 
decisions of that agency and other agencies, the agency's use of post 
hoc rationalizations and proposed modifications, and the agency's 
treatment of scientific controversy and public opposition. The ap-
proach intentionally avoids conclusory labels such as "reasonable-
ness," "arbitrary and capricious," "hard look," and "convincing 
case," and does not attempt to characterize the threshold decision as a 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983); Strycker's Bay 
Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 229 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
115. See note 38 supra and accompanying text. 
116. Maryland-Natl Capital Park, 487 F.2d at 1040. 
117. See Winnebago Tribe v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269, 271 (8th. Cir. 1980). 
118. Maryland-Natl Capital Park, 487 F.2d at 1040; cf. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. 
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) ("[T]he court must consider whether the decision was based on a 
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment .... 
[T]his inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful ...• "). 
119. 487 F.2d at 1040. For a detailed discussion of the appropriate role of project modifica-
tions as a justification for forgoing preparation of an EIS, see notes 148-52 infra and accompany-
ing text. 
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question of fact or of law. Instead, it focuses judicial attention on 
agency compliance with NEP A's procedural mandates, 120 the key to 
the statute's substantive impact. 
Concededly, the test requires rigorous judicial analysis of agency 
decisions and in that respect may be viewed as relatively nondeferen-
tial. A rigorous judicial analysis is 'favored by NEP A's mandatory 
terms, 121 the EIS requirement's applicability to all agencies - includ-
ing those without expertise in environmental matters122 - the preter-
mission of further environmental inquiry occasioned by a FONS!, 123 
NEP A's lack of precise language or legislative history, 124 and the per-
petual tension between primary agency concerns and environmental 
concerns in agency decisionmaking.125 Furthermore, closer scrutiny 
parallels the reasoning of those courts applying the first step in the 
Overton Park analysis to the EIS threshold decision. 126 
Various courts have given considerable weight to many of the fac-
tors incorporated in this approach. 127 Consistent testing of FONSis 
against all of these factors would greatly improve the uniformity of 
review in this area. The need for uniformity and the importance of a 
judicial check on administrative discretion in FONSis call for judicial 
resolution of the burden of proof issue as a starting point. 
1. ·Burden of Proof of a Challenger to an Agency FONS/ 
The initial goal of the reviewing court should be to ensure that 
those who challenge an agency's decision not to prepare an EIS 
demonstrate that there is a substantial possibility that the proposed 
action will significantly affect the environment. Since NEPA and the 
CEQ regulations clearly contemplate situations not requiring EISs, 128 
challengers should be required to show more than a mere possibility 
that the action may have a significant impact; otherwise, an EIS will 
120. Under the APA standards, the reviewing court is required to set aside agency decisions 
made "without observance of procedure required by law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(0) (1982). 
121. See, e.g., Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1249 (10th 
Cir. 1973). 
122. See F. ANDERSON, supra note l, at 104-05. But see River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps 
ofEngrs. of United States Army, 764 F.2d 445, 449 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1283 
(1986). 
123. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081, 1085 (5th Cir. 1985); see also City of Davis v. 
Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 670 (9th Cir. 1975); Comment, supra note 11, at 82. 
124. See Note, supra note 22, at 115. 
125. See note 28 supra and accompanying text. 
126. See notes 55-73 supra and accompanying text. 
127. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 875 (1st Cir. 1985) (proper distinction 
between EA and EIS); 769 F.2d at 873 (agency's consultations with other agencies); Louisiana v. 
Lee, 758 F.2d 1081, 1085 (5th Cir. 1985) (inconsistency with agency's prior decisions); Rucker 
v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158, 162 (4th Cir. 1973) (public opposition distinguished from scientific 
controversy). 
128. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text. 
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almost always be required. On the other hand, given the possibility 
that significant impacts might be revealed only after the detailed anal-
ysis an EIS entails, 129 the court should require less than a clear show-
ing that the action will have a significant impact. Furthermore, courts 
that require the challenger to address issues not considered in the ad-
ministrative record, in addition to inadequate treatment of issues that 
the agency did consider, should allow the challenger to rely on infor-
mation both in and outside of the record. 130 The most sensible burden 
of proof for the challenger, therefore, is to raise a substantial possibil-
ity, not yet considered or inadequately addressed by the agency, that 
the action will have a significant impact on the environment. 
2. Proper Distinction Between the EA and the EIS 
The court should also ensure that the agency has not attempted to 
substitute an EA for an EIS. 131 The critical factors in making this 
determination are the length of the EA and the extent to which it 
balances relevant factors. 132 A long EA that discusses environmental 
concerns in detail should be considered highly suspect if used to sup-
port a FONS!, as it most likely indicates the existence of significant 
impacts and thus the need for an EIS. Courts suggesting that a de-
tailed EA is often a substitute for an EIS133 ignore the fundamental 
difference in the purposes of EAs and EISs. 134 A detailed EA should 
129. See note 107 supra and accompanying text. 
130. Cf note 110 supra and accompanying text. 
131. Recently, the Seventh Circuit sanctioned such a substitution in River Road Alliance, 
Inc. v. Corps ofEngrs. of United States Army, 764 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. 
Ct. 1283 (1986). The court interpreted the role of the EA to be to determine "whether there is 
enough likelihood of significant environmental consequences to justify the time and expense of 
preparing an environmental impact statement," 764 F.2d at 449, and held that EAs are typically 
thorough enough to allow the court to apply a higher threshold of significance before requiring 
an agency to prepare an EIS. 764 F.2d at 451. Cf Maryland-Natl. Capital Park and Planning 
Commn. v. United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[l]n cases involv-
ing genuine issues as to health, and environmental resources, there is a relatively low threshold 
for impact statements ..•. "). In River Road Alliance, Judge Posner noted "evidence in the 
recent cases of a loosening of the judicial reins on agency decisions not to require environmental 
impact statements." 764 F.2d at 450. However, while accepting the legal realism inherent in his 
position - that courts today can allow an EA to do the work of an EIS because EAs are some-
how more thorough today than in the past - Posner explicitly rejected consideration of the 
"realism about the danger of abuse" that exists when nonenvironmental agencies are forced stat-
utorily to consider environmental concerns "to the fullest extent possible" in making decisions. 
See 764 F.2d at 449. For an opposite view on consideration of administrative resource allocation, 
sees. TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE-
MENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 75 (1984); Note, Does NEPA Require an Im-
pact Statement on Inaction?, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1337, 1368 (1983). 
132. See notes 40-44 supra and accompanying text. 
133. See, e.g., River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps ofEngrs. of United States Army, 764 F.2d 
445, 451 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1283 (1986). 
134. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 875 (1st Cir. 1985); notes 33-44 supra and 
accompanying text. 
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be convertible into a sufficient EIS with little time and expense. 135 
Furthermore, judicial refusal to allow EAs to substitute for EISs 
would most likely reduce the time and expense of litigation that is 
likely to result when EISs are not prepared in borderline cases. 
Examination of the extent to which an EA balances factors is cru-
cial in evaluating the validity of a FONS!. While an agency is free to 
recognize social and economic factors that favor an action, those fac-
tors can never justify the decision to forgo an EIS. Only after prepara-
tion of an EIS can an agency determine that economic and social 
factors outweigh significant environmental impacts and thereby justify 
a decision to proceed with an action. 
3. Consistency with Other Decisions of the Agency 
The court should allow challengers of the agency decision to pre-
sent evidence that the agency required EISs for similar actions. If a 
pattern of significant environmental effects from a certain type of ac-
tion is apparent, 136 the court should then impose a burden of persua-
sion on the agency to support its atypical decision not to prepare an 
EIS. A type of action that has never been considered by the agency 
should also trigger more skeptical review. 137 Conversely, an action 
that the agency has "categorically excluded,"138 in accordance with 
the CEQ regulations and its own internal procedures, should trigger 
greater deference to the agency's decision. 
4. Consistency with Advice of Other Agencies 
The problem with relying on agency discretion is intensified when 
the agency making the threshold EIS decision has primary concerns 
that conflict with environmental concems. 139 Both NEPA and the 
CEQ regulations thus contemplate interagency consultation prior to 
making the threshold decision. 140 An agency decision that does not 
135. See Marsh, 169 F.2d at 875. 
136. See Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081, 1085 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that the Corps of 
Engineers' decision not to prepare an EIS for a shell·dredging project was inconsistent with its 
prior decisions to prepare EISs for several other shell-dredging projects that produced fewer 
shells); Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1250 n.9 (10th Cir. 
1973) (noting that the Forest Service had issued a directive to Regional Foresters requiring EISs 
for timber sales similar to the one being challenged). 
137. See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(reviewing the National Institutes of Health's decision to approve the first deliberate release of 
genetically engineered recombinant-DNA-containing organisms, and noting the court's role in 
ensuring "that the bold words and vigorous spirit of NEPA are not .•• lost or misdirected in the 
brisk frontiers of science"); cf 40 C.F.R. § l501.4(e)(2)(ii) (1986) (requiring agencies, before 
deciding whether to prepare an EIS, to allow an extended public comment period for proposed 
FONSis relating to actions "without precedent"). 
138. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. 
139. See note 28 supra and accompanying text. 
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1982) ("Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsi-
ble Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has 
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consider the advice of other agencies should be considered highly sus-
pect, especially when a primarily nonenvironmental agency ignores 
the advice of an agency with expertise in environmental matters. 141 
As a corollary, courts should permit challengers of the agency de-
cision to attack any administrative record that does not include any 
references to advice obtained from environmental agencies. An 
agency that fails to obtain such information contravenes clear man-
dates from NEPA, the CEQ regulations, and, often, the agency's own 
regulations, 142 and thus commits a procedural error.143 
5. Post-hoc Rationalizations 
Courts should be wary of an agency's use of "post-hoc rationaliza-
tions" to support a FONSI. 144 In the Overton Park decision, 145 the 
Supreme Court found that litigation affidavits used by the agency to 
explain its decision constituted an inadequate basis for review because 
they were not a reliable reflection of the agency's decisionmaking pro-
cess.146 One circuit relied on this part of Overton Park to hold that an 
EA revised by an agency in response to a challenge of a decision not to 
prepare an EIS amounts to a post-hoc rationalization that the review-
ing court must view critically and without deference to the agency. 147 
Such nondeferential treatment of post-hoc rationalizations is 
proper because they are necessarily produced in an atmosphere of con-
troversy which is likely to exacerbate any tension between the agency's 
possible development-oriented motives and environmental concerns. 
jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved."); 40 
C.F.R. § 1501.4(b) (1985) ("The agency shall involve environmental agencies, applicants, and 
the public, to the extent practicable, in preparing assessments ... . ");cf. 33 C.F.R. § 230.9(c) 
(1986) (Corps of Engineers provision requiring EAs to include a list of agencies consulted during 
preparation of the EA, but not specifying that other agencies must be consulted). 
Although the requirement to consult other agencies appears in NEPA in the section describ-
ing actual preparation of an EIS, at least one court has applied it to EA preparation. See Sierra 
Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 873 (1st Cir. 1985); see also Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 
822 (9th Cir. 1986) (Corps of Engineers decision not to prepare an EIS upheld; court notes 
approval of environmental agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency and the Fish 
and Wildlife Service). 
141. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 868 (1st Cir. 1985); River Road Alliance, Inc. 
v. Corps ofEngrs. of United States Army, 764 F,2d 445, 458 (7th Cir. 1985) (Wood, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1283 (1986); see also W. RODGERS, supra note 24, at 753. 
142. See note 140 supra. 
143. At least one court would remand cases involving procedural errors in the agency's de-
termination of no significant impact. In cases in which the court determines that the action may 
have a significant impact, the court would require the agency to prepare an EIS. See Fritiofson v. 
Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985). 
144. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971). 
145. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
146. 401 U.S. at 419. The Court cited Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 
156, 167-69 (1962) (courts may not accept an agency's rationale in litigation if that rationale was 
not evinced in the official explanation of the agency's action). 
147. Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081, 1085 (5th, Cir. 1985). 
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Thus, the court must ensure that agency explanations given subse-
quent to an opponent's challenge were developed through proper rein-
spection of the relevant factors, such as by obtaining external advice, 
and not through adaptative reiteration of flawed reasoning. 
6. Modifications 
The courts have been unclear concerning the weight to give to 
planned project modifications that purport to reduce environmental 
impacts below the degree of significance triggering an EIS.148 While 
the apparent consensus is that modifications should be able to support 
a decision not to prepare an EIS, 149 most courts have established that 
the mere promise that a modification will mitigate environmental im-
pact is insufficient. 150 Otherwise, there is too great a possibility that 
the agency may subsequently alter the proposed modifications so that 
the significance of environmental impacts increases, and therefore that 
agencies could use possible mitigation measures as an excuse for 
sidestepping the EIS requirement. 151 In order to weigh modifications 
properly, a reviewing court should require that the agency be legally 
bound to carry out modifications reducing the significance of the ac-
tion's environmental impact.152 
7. Treatment of Controversy 
Courts have disagreed over the proper treatment of scientific con-
trovery about and public opposition to proposed actions. Both the 
CEQ regulations153 and several internal agency procedures154 identify 
"controversy" as one factor in determining the environmental signifi-
148. Compare Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 
1985) ("[S]o long as significant measures are undertaken to 'mitigate the project's effects,' they 
need not completely compensate for adverse environmental impacts.'') (emphasis in original), with 
Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 860 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[M]odifications may 
make the preparation of an EIS unnecessary, [but they] must be more than vague statements of 
good intentions."). 
149. See Leventhal, supra note 28, at 524; Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's 
National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,038 (1981) [hereinafter 
Forty Most Asked Questions]. 
150. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 877 (1st Cir. 1985); Preservation Coalition, Inc. 
v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 860 (9th Cir. 1982). 
151. See Forty Most Asked Questions, supra note 149, at 18,038. 
152. The CEQ has stated explicitly that agencies may rely on project modifications to make 
FONSis "only if they are imposed by statute or regulation, or submitted by an applicant or 
agency as part of the original proposal.'' Forty Most Asked Questions, supra note 149, at 18,038. 
Thus, in Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1986), the court upheld a Corps of 
Engineers after-the-fact permit allowing a developer to fill a wetland where the permit was condi-
tioned on a mitigation agreement requiring the developer to purchase substitute land and convert 
it to wetlands. But see Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 682 (D.C. Cir. 
1982) ("The 'Forty Questions' publication ... is merely an informal statement, not a regulation, 
and we do not find it to be persuasive authority."). 
153. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(4) (1986). 
154. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 230.4 (1986) (Corps of Engineers regulations incorporating the 
October 1986] Note - Review of NEPA Findings 215 
cance of an action but fail to define the term adequately. Some courts, 
however, have made a sensible distinction between opposition and 
controversy.155 According to these courts, opposition alone should 
not be sufficient cause for overturning or remanding a FONS! if the 
scientific community is in relative agreement over the potential effects 
of an action. 156 By contrast, these courts define controversy as ex-
isting when reasoned theories on the environmental impact of an ac-
tion conflict. 157 In that case, courts should require the agency to make 
a stronger showing that an EIS is not needed to resolve the conflict. 
The rationale for distinguishing opposition from controversy is 
that allowing public opposition alone to force agencies to prepare EISs 
surrenders the threshold decision to agency opponents. For example, 
courts should not require agencies to bend to opposition based on fac-
tors that are not legitimate subjects of the NEPA review process.158 
On the other hand, substantial disputes in the scientific community 
over the environmental impacts of an action logically indicate the need 
for more detailed study in an EIS. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In the context of the decision to .forgo an EIS, "abuse of discre-
tion" must be considered a flexible term, given that federal agencies 
with diverse and sometimes environmentally insensitive objectives are 
all subject to the same requirement to consider environmental factors 
CEQ definitions by reference); 40 C.F.R. § 6.509(b) (1986) (Environmental Protection Agency 
regulations). 
155. See, e.g., Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 986-87 (9th Cir. 
1985) (distinguishing Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. United States Dept. of Agric., 681 
F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1982), in which the court referred to "numerous reponses from conservation-
ists, biologists, and other knowledgeable individuals, all highly critical of the EA and all disput-
ing the EA 's conclusion," from the situation in which "virtual agreement exists among local, 
state, and federal government officials, private parties, and local environmentalists.") (emphasis 
in original); Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158, 162 (4th Cir. 1973) (public controversy is only an 
important factor "where a substantial dispute exists as to the size, nature or effect of the major 
federal action rather than to the existence of opposition to a use."); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 
F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); see also Como-Falcon Commu-
nity Coalition, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Labor, 609 F.2d 342, 345-46 (8th Cir. 1979) (public 
opposition based on socio-economic factors alone not enough to warrant preparation of an EIS), 
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980). But cf. J. HEER & D. HAGERTY, ENVIRONMENTAL AssESS-
MENTS AND STATEMENTS 111-12 (1977) ("When in doubt as to the applicability of NEPA to a 
particular action which has been challenged by a citizen's environmental group, the courts ap-
pear to have taken the attitude that if doubt does exist or if public opposition is significant, an 
impact statement should be prepared."). 
156. See note 155 supra. 
157. Courts sometimes express their unwillingness to rule on the "relative merits of compet-
ing scientific opinion." See, e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Dept. ofTransp., 753 F.2d 120, 129 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 
787 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). In the context of the threshold decision, however, a court does not neces-
sarily choose between competing technical positions by requiring further detailed study. 
158. See Como-Falcon Community Coalition, Ii;ic. v. United States Dept. of Labor, 609 F.2d 
342, 345-46 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980). 
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in decisionmaking. The NEPA threshold decision is particularly sus-
ceptible to agency abuse because many federal agencies have primary 
development-oriented concerns inherently at odds with environmental 
considerations. Furthermore, because NEPA is designed to influence 
substantive agency decisions through procedural mandates, the judi-
cial role in reviewing agency decisions to cut short those procedures 
must be especially rigorous. 
A careful review of the different approaches for reviewing agency 
decisions not to prepare an EIS reveals that both the reasonableness 
and the arbitary and capricious standards fail to provide a consistent 
approach for reviewing FONSis. The goal in enunciating a proper 
standard should be to identify crucial points of inquiry for determining 
the appropriate degree of deference a court should give an agency de-
termination that an action will have no significant impact. This Note 
outlines an approach that achieves that goal. 
- Geoffrey Garver 
